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Recent Decisions
Criminal Law - No Defense To Statutory Rape That
Victim Is Married Woman Below The Age Of Consent.
People v. Courtney, 4 Cal. Rptr. 274 (1960). Defendant
was indicted for statutory rape of a female under eighteen
years of age who was married, but not to defendant. The
California statute makes a girl under eighteen years of age
incapable of giving legal consent to illicit acts of sexual
intercourse. Defendant contended that the purpose of the
statute was to protect young, innocent, naive girls from
illicit acts of sexual intercourse, and that the victim, as a
married woman, did not fall within the class of persons
which the statute was designed to protect. The court, in
adhering to the express language of the statute, held that
the fact that the girl was married was no defense to a
charge of statutory rape since the statute did not make an
exception for married females.
In State v. Huntsman, 115 Utah 283, 204 P. 2d 448
(1949), a similar contention was advanced by a defendant
charged with statutory rape, but the court in rejecting it
said that had the legislature intended to exclude married
females from the protection of the statute it could easily
have done so. The Maryland, statutes on carnal knowledge
provide: "If any person shall carnally know and abuse any
woman child under the age of fourteen years . . . every
such carnal knowledge shall be deemed [sic] felony .... "
3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 462; "If any person shall
carnally know any female not his wife, between the ages
of fourteen and sixteen years, such carnal knowledge shall
be deemed a misdemeanor.. ." 3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27,
§ 464. The contention raised in the instant case has never
been ruled upon by the Maryland Court of Appeals.
Domestic Relations - Award Of Child's Support May
Include Funds For College Education. Pass v. Pass, ......
Miss ......... , 118 So. 2d 769 (1960). Petitioner, a divorcee
having custody of her eighteen year old daughter who
had graduated from high school with a brilliant record,
sought an increase in a prior award for child support
so that the daughter might attend college. The divorced
father had an, income in excess of $12,000 a year. In
upholding an order increasing the award, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi held that it was not improper to
compel the financially capable father to provide funds
for the college education of his gifted minor daughter.
RECENT DECISIONS
The courts have consistently imposed an obligation on
the divorced father to provide -his minor children with
at least a high school education. O'Brien v. Springer, 202
Misc. 210, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 631, 56 A.L.R. 2d 1207, 1213 (1957).
Some jurisdictions have indicated that the divorced father's
duty to support includes college expenses for a child who
has demonstrated college aptitude, where such a duty will
not place an overwhelming burden on 'him. Calogeras v.
Calogeras, ..... Ohio St ......... , 163 N.E. 2d 713 (1959);
Strom v. Strom, 13 Ill. App. 2d 354, 142 N.E. 2d 172 (1957).
Other jurisdictions, in the absence of agreement, refuse to
require a divorced father to provide funds for his child's
college education, regardless of his financial capacity or
the child's aptitude. Haag v. Haag, ........ Ind ......... 163
N.E. 2d 243 (1959); Commonwealth v. Stomel, 180 Pa.
Super. 573, 119 A. 2d 597 (1956). See 56 A.L.R. 2d 1207
(1957); MADDEN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PERSONs AND
DOmTTC RELATIONS (1931) § 112.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has not decided the
question of whether a divorced father can be compelled to
contribute to his child's college education. In Johnson v.
Johnson, 202 Md. 547, 97 A. 2d 330 (1953), the Court in-
dicated that the factors to be considered in an award of
child support included, inter alia, the child's present and
future needs for education and the possibility that these
needs might increase. The instant case dealt with a
statute almost identical to 6 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 72A, § 1,
which provides that the parents are charged with the
support, care, nurture, and education of their minor chil-
dren.
Evidence - Plea Of Guilty To Traffic Offense Admis-
sible In Subsequent Civil Suit As Evidence Of Negligence.
Ando v. Woodberry, et al., 8 N.Y. 2d 165, 168 N.E. 2d 520
(1960). Defendant pleaded guilty in traffic court to a
charge of making an improper turn. In a subsequent civil
suit, plaintiff, whom defendant struck when making the
improper turn, attempted to introduce defendant's traffic
court plea of guilty as an admission by defendant of his
negligence. The trial court refused to allow the evidence.
In reversing, the New York Court of Appeals, in a case of
first impression in that court, held that the plea of guilty
constituted an admission and should have been allowed
in the civil suit as evidence of facts constituting negli-
gence. The dissent felt that the plea of guilty should not
be allowed because most people charged with minor traffic
19611
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
violations plead guilty to avoid inconvenience, regardless
of their guilt or innocence.
The majority of jurisdictions hold that a plea of guilty
by an accused in a criminal case may be introduced against
him as an admission in a subsequent civil suit arising out
of the same offense. Koch v. Elkins, 71 Idaho 50, 225
P. 2d 457 (1950); Piechota v. Rapp, 148 Neb. 443, 27 N.W.
2d 682 (1947). Such a plea is not treated as conclusive and
may be explained by the defendant. MCCORHICK, EVIDENCE
(1954) § 242, n. 32. There are a few courts that will not
admit evidence of a plea of guilty in a subsequent civil
suit, specifically in traffic cases, but this exclusion is
usually controlled by statute. Warren v. Marsh, 215 Minn.
615, 11 N.W. 2d 528 (1943). The Maryland Court of Appeals
has not ruled on the instant question. Cases are collected
in 18 A.L.R. 2d 1287, 1307 (1951).
Mortgages - Termination Of Interest Payments In
Foreclosure Proceedings. Ex Parte Aurora Federal Savings
and Loan Ass'n, 223 Md. 135, 162 A. 2d 739 (1960). A
mortgage called for payment of interest by mortgagor until
the whole of the principal sum and interest was paid.
The mortgagor defaulted and after foreclosure proceedings
and a sale by the trustee pursuant to 5 MD. CODE (1957)
Art. 66, § 6, a question arose as to whether the principal
sum due the mortgagee was paid when the foreclosure
sale took place or when the auditor's account was ratified,
said ratification occurring several months after the sale.
The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County allowed the
mortgagee interest only up to the date of the foreclosure
sale. The Maryland Court of Appeals, in a case of first
impression, reversed the lower court and held that the
mortgagee was entitled to interest until the date of the
ratification of the auditor's account. The Court said that
5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 66, § 6, which provides, in part,
that the proceeds of foreclosure sales shall be accounted
for and be distributed by the court in the usual manner of
sales by decree, did not prevent the parties from agreeing
to payment of interest beyond the date of the foreclosure
sale. The Court further said that in Maryland a mort-
gagee is not actually paid his claim until ratification of
the auditor's account. Thus it concluded that, in view of
the terms of the mortgage, the parties had agreed to the
payment of interest beyond the date of the foreclosure
sale.
[VOL. XXI
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In seven Maryland counties, Anne Arundel County
not included, it is provided by statute that interest pay-
ments on a mortgage shall continue for sixty days after
the foreclosure sale or until the ratification of the audi-
tor's account, whichever occurs first. 5 MD. CODE (Cum.
Supp. 1960) Art. 66, § 8.
For cases from other jurisdictions reaching a result
similar to that of the instant case see Trompen v. Ham-
mond, 61 Neb. 446, 85 N.W. 436 (1901), and Lombard
Inv. Co. v. Barton, 5 Kan. App. 197, 47 P. 154 (1896).
See also 134 A.L.R. 846 (1941).
Quasi Contracts - Quantum Meruit Recovery Upon
Attorney's Lien For Services Under A Champertous Con-
tract. Application of Kamerman, 278 F. 2d 411 (2nd Cir.
1960). Petitioner, an attorney, represented a corporation
in a tax refund action in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York under an agree-
ment which provided that he was to bear the expense of
an expert witness. In an ancillary proceeding, petitioner
sought to enforce an attorney's lien for his fee, which was
based on this agreement. Because the agreement was
champertous, the District Court denied the attorney's lien
on, the ground that it was equitable in nature, but indi-
cated that recovery on a quantum meruit basis could be
sought in an action at law. On appeal, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit adopted the view that an
attorney may recover on a quantum meruit basis for ser-
vices rendered under a champertous fee agreement, but
reversed and remanded to allow a lien for an amount to
be determined by quantum meruit.
,An agreement between an attorney and client is cham-
pertous, and thus unlawful, if it provides that the attorney
will undertake to carry on the litigation at his own ex-
pense and risk. 6 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1938)
§ 1712.
The view adopted in the instant case represents the
weight of authority in the United States. 85 A.L.R. 1365
(1933). The minority view is that the champertous con-
duct of an attorney should bar recovery of both the agreed
compensation and the value of his services. Notable
,among those supporting the minority view are
6 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1938) § 1713, 4841;
and RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 545, 1049. There is
no Maryland Court of Appeals decision on point. How-
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ever, champerty is a species of barratry, the crime of
frequently inciting or soliciting litigation, PERKms ON
CRIMINAL LAW (1957) Ch. 5, 449, and barratry is a mis-
demeanor in Maryland, 3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 13.
For further discussion, see Note, Collateral Effects of Cham-
pertous Agreements, 27 Col. L. Rev. 981 (1927); Note,
Attorney's Recovery for Services Under a Void or Chain-
pertous Contract, 3 Iowa L. Bull. 43 (1917).
Real Property - Surface Water - Civil Law Rule As
Affected By Reasonableness Of Use Rule. Sainato v. Potter,
222 Md. 263, 159 A. 2d 632 (1960). Defendants owned lot 7
and plaintiffs owned lot 8, the lots being adjacent. In
its original state, lot 7 was higher than lot 8. Surface
water drained from lot 7 across lot 8. Plaintiffs later graded
lot 8 which raised its level above that of lot 7, causing
surface water to collect on lot 7. Defendants then filled in
lot 7, making it once again higher than lot 8, and causing
silt and debris to be washed onto lot 8 by the renewed
flow of surface water. Plaintiffs, although denied, injunc-
tive relief in the lower court, were awarded damages.
Defendants appealed and the Court of Appeals held that
plaintiffs could recover damages for excessive amounts of
silt and debris, but not for the renewed flow of surface
water. The Court indicated that although defendants
had a right under the civil law rule to raise the level of
lot 7 even though this renewed the flow of surface water
across plaintiffs' land, they did have a duty under the
reasonableness of use rule to take precautions against
unduly harming plaintiff's land with silt and debris.
The majority of jurisdictions in the United States,
including Maryland, adhere to the civil law rule under
which a higher landowner is entitled to have surface
water flow naturally from his land onto lower lands, the
lower landowners having no right to obstruct it. Battisto
v. Perkins, 210 Md. 542, 124 A. 2d 288 (1956); Shanan v.
Brown, 179 Ala. 425, 60 So. 891 (1913); Bradbury v.
Vandalia Levee and Drainage Dist., 236 Ill. 36, 86 N.E. 163
(1908). The principal minority view is the common enemy
doctrine, which allows a lower landowner to ward off
and obstruct surface water coming from other lands.
Chadeayne v. Robinson, 55 Conn. 345, 11 A. 592 (1887);
56 Am. Jur. 552, Waters, § 69. A third view is the rea-
sonableness of use rule, under which landowners must
take reasonable precautions against harming each other's
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property. City of Franklin v. Durgee, 71 N.H. 186, 51 A.
911 (1901); Note, Rule as to Surface Waters in Minnesota,
2 Minn. L. Rev. 449 (1918). The instant qase, following
earlier Maryland cases, indicates that Maryland also ap-
plies the reasonableness of use rule to preclude undue
hardship to an adjoining landowner under too strict an
application of the civil law rule. See Note, Maryland
Surface Waters - A Critical Analysis, 18 Md. L. Rev. 61
(1958); and Note, Drainage of Surface Waters under the
Civil Law Rule as Applied in Maryland, 11 Md. L. Rev.
58(1950).
Sales - The Necessity For Privity Of Contract In
Breach Of Implied Warranty. Peterson v. Lamb Rubber
Company, ........ Cal. 2d ........ 353 P. 2d 575 (1960). Plain-
tiff was injured while using a defectively manufactured
abrasive wheel which had been purchased by his em-
ployer from defendant manufacturer. Plaintiff sought to
recover from defendant for breach of implied warranties
of fitness for use and of merchantable quality, relying on§ 15 of the UNIroRm SALES AcT, adopted in California.
The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer on the
ground that no privity of contract existed between plaintiff
and, defendant. The California Supreme Court, in over-
ruling the trial court, held that as the plaintiff was a
member of the industrial family of his employer, and
since privity existed between employer and defendant,
plaintiff could recover.
Generally no recovery is allowed for breach, of im-
plied warranty unless privity of contract exists. Burr v.
Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P. 2d 1041
(1954). An exception to this rule which has gained ac-
ceptance in California and a few other jurisdictions is in
the case of food and beverages where privity is not re-
quired between consumer and manufacturer. Vaccarezza
v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. App. 2d 687, 163 P. 2d 470 (1945);
Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164
S.W. 2d 828 (1942). The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, now
adopted in five states, § 2-318, extends a seller's warranty to
persons in the family or household of the buyer, or to
guests of the buyer if it is reasonable to expect that such
persons may use, consume, or be affected by the goods.
Maryland is more strict than California on the re-
quirement of privity in that it does not recognize any
exception to the general rule. State v. Consol. Gas Etc.
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Co., 146 Md. 390, 126 A. 105 (1924). However, in Vac-
carino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 A. 2d 316 (1943), noted
8 Md. L. Rev. 461 (1943), it was held that where plain-
tiff's daughter purchased pork sausage for family use
from defendant grocer, privity did exist between plaintiff
and defendant since the daughter was plaintiff's agent
in making the purchase. See further 18 Md. L. Rev. 268
(1958).
Taxation - New Formula For Determining Home
Builder's Taxable Gain From Sale Of Homes Subject To
Ground Rents. Welsh Homes, Inc. v. C.I.R., 279 F. 2d 391
(4th Cir. 1960). Taxpayer, a real estate developer in
Maryland, bought unimproved land and divided it into
lots. On each lot he erected a house and created ground
rents which he retained upon sale of the houses and
transfer of the leasehold interests. The Tax Court applied
a new method for computing the taxable gain upon the
sale of a leasehold interest by allocating the builder's costs
between the reversion and the leasehold, and deducting
the cost allocable to the leasehold interest from its sales
price. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming
the decision, of the Tax Court, adopted this new formula.
The formula is: ". . the ratio of the value of the lease-
hold to the aggregate value of the leasehold and the re-
versionary interest is first ascertained and then the ratio
is applied to the aggregate cost of the land and the building.
The result obtained represents the cost basis of the lease-
hold." (394). Using the Court's illustration, if a buyer
pays $12,000 for the leasehold interest in an improved
lot subject to an annual ground rent of $120, which
capitalized at 6 % is $2,000, the value of the whole property
is $14,000. If the builder paid $500 for the land and
$10,000 to construct the house, the ratio of the value of
the leasehold to the value of the whole property is twelve-
fourteenths. Applying this ratio to the total costs of the
builder, the cost of the leasehold is thus determined to be
$9000, resulting in a taxable gain of $3000 to the builder.
Under the old formula, the gain was measured by the
difference between the purchase price of the leasehold
and the cost of constructing the house. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Simmers' Estate, 231 F. 2d 909 (4th
Cir. 1956), noted in 17 Md. L. Rev. 241 (1957). The new
formula was first suggested in this note. See also 19 Md.
L. Rev. 349 (1959).
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